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James et al. (FTCA 
claimant) 
..--< 
Cert to @_ (en bane) (Reavley, 
Clark, Goldoerg, Rupin, Politz, Gf 
Randall, T~te, Johnson, Williams; / 
Gee~ diss., Garwo'od, Jolly, v:; 
Davis, Hitl; Higginbotham, diss.) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Does Section 3 of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 
33 U.S.C. §702c give the United States absolute immunity where there 
would otherwise be liability under the Federal Tort Claims ~ct, 28 
u.s.c. §§2671-80 for personal injury esulting from government em-
l1u- m el!U.0 - w rl-
h;rl cLt ~ ( tkcd- su_}l 
'I Yrl VJ!lAbtVi -u_ ·nu_ 6o 
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ployees' negligent failure to warn of government-created hazards to 
known recreational users? 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: In the first of these con-
solidated cases, the Corps of Engineers discharged water through the 
Millwood Dam in Arkansas, a federal flood control project. A vio-
lent current was created near the dam. No signs warned of the dan-
ger and government personnel knew that buoys, used as warning de-
vices, had broken away. James and Butler, who were skiing nearby, 
were pulled by the strong current and injured. Attempting to rescue 
his wife, Butler's husband dove into the water and drowned. After a 
bench trial, the DC awarded damages, but concluded that section 702c 
barred plaintiffs' recovery because the injuries resulted from 
floodwaters related to a flood control project. 
In the second case, Clardy and his son were fishing in a bayou 
in Louisiana. The bayou is part of a flood control project. Two 
faded warning signs were located at the entrance of the drainage 
structure. Government employees opened the gates of the structure, 
resulting in a strong current that swept the Clardys and their boat 
near the structure. ~hat was when they first saw the warning signs. 
The son drowned while being pulle~ by the current through a barrel 
of the drainage structure. The DC entered summary judgment for the 
government, holding that the government had immunity under section 
702c. 
Under section 702c, "No liability of any kind shall attach to 
the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood 
waters at any place," provided that if on any of the banks of the 
Mississippi River it is "impracticable to construct levees, either 
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because such construction is not economically justified or because 
such construction would unreasonably restrict the floo<l channel," 
then the government must institute proceedings "to acquire either 
the absolute ownership of the lands so subjected to overflow damage 
or floodage rights over such lands."l 
CAS found the statutory language ambiguous. "We do not think, 
for instance, that it is evident what constitutes a 'flood' or 
'floodwaters.' Nor is the word 'damage' quite unequivocal. Nor, 
indeed, is it clear why 'at any place' was tacked on to the sen-
tence •••• " After reviewing the legislative history, CAS concluded 
that the disclaimer of immunity was directed solely at flooding. 
Congress shifted most of the risks and costs of flooding onto local-
ities and private owners. CAS found it doubtful that Congress in-
tended to shield the negligent or wrongful acts of government em-
ployees. 
1 The full language is: 
No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the 
United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at 
any place: Provided, however, that if in carrying out the 
purposes of sections 702a, 702b to 702d, 702e to 702g, 702h, 
702i, 702j, 702k, 7021, 702m and 704 of this title it shall be 
found that upon any sl:retch of the banks of the Mississippi River 
it is impracticable to construct levees, either because such 
construction is not economically justified or because such 
construction would unreasonably restrict the flood channel, and 
lands in such stretch of the river are subjected to overflow and 
damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by reason of the 
construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it 
shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of 
Engineers to institute proceedings on behalf of the United States 
Government to acquire either the absolute ownership of the lands 




In interpreting the provision, most courts have cited only the 
general disclaimer stating that no liability shal 1 attach for any 
flood damage at any place. They have misconstrued it to grant immu-
nity in the "broadest and most emphatic language." National Mfg. 
Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (CAB), cert. denied, 347 
u.s. 967 (1954). See also Callaway v. United States, 56B F.2d 6B4, 
6B7 (CAlO 197B); Parks v. United States, 370 F.2d 92 (CA2 1966). 
But see Peterson v. United States, 367 F.2d 271, 276 (CA9 1966) (no 
immunity when governmental action was wholly unrelated to any act of 
Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood con-
trol); Hayes v. United States, 5B5 F.2d 701 (CA4 197B) (restricting 
immunity to management of the water only if the purpose of flood 
control is thereby served) • 
In the other appellate cases in which 702c was considered, 21 
of the 23 cases were brought to recover damages to property. The 
other 2 decisions did not immunize the government from personal 
injury liability. In Wright v. United States, 56B F.2d 153, 155 
(CAlO 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. B24 (197B), brought as a wrong-
ful death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the government 
asserted §702c as a defense, but the court held the government im-
mune on other grounds. In Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221 
(CAB 1977), an action for damage to property and personal injury 
(including death), the court did not decide the §702c question. 
~he immunity should apply to the fault of government employees 
in controlling floodgates or managing lands to contain floods or 
floodwaters. Because of §702c, the government's acts to store, 
divert, and release waters to further flood control are subject to 
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no risk of liability. "If, however, the government allows people to 
come upon those waters or nearby shores for purposes of recreation, 
section 702c grants no immunity for government fault in creating a 
danger or in failing to warn of danger to the public. If a produc-
ing cause of the damage or injury is a government employee's negli-
gence in omissions or commissions that diverge from acts strictly 
for the purpose of controlling floods or floodwaters, and the pres-
ence or movement of water for flood control purposes merely fur-
nishes a condition of the accident, there is no seciton 702c immuni-
ty." The James and Butler case is reversed, and the Clardy case is 
reversed and remanded for further factfinding. 
Judge Gee dissented, saying that the majority ignored the plain 
words of the statute. Further, the majority's holding is unclear. 
The government here was releasing water to further flood control, 
which should protect it under the majority's ruling. But then the 
majority goes on to say that if such release creates a danger or if 
the government fails to warn of one, and someone is injured, then 
the government is liable. All the precedents, including in CAS, go 
the other way. 
,Judge Higginbotham dissented. There is no clear evidence about 
what Congress intended to do in §702c, so the court should defer to 
the longstanding and unanimous contruction placed on it. The task 
of changing such a settled construction at this point should be left 
to Congress. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that CAS's decision radically 
departs from the construction of §702c given by every other appel-
late decision interpreting the statute, and is contrary to both the 
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plain language and the purpose of the provision. The decision will 
likely result in the imposition of substantial monetary liability on 
the government due to the large number of flood control projects. 
CAS's interpretation conflicts with the plain language of the stat-
ute and with Congress' purpose. 
Resps Butler and James contend that CAS's interpretation is 
consistent with the wording of the statute, its historical context 
and the legislative history. Resp Clardy contends that the legisla-
tive history shows that the immunity was not intended to cover con-
sequential damages or damages for personal injuries. 
4. DISCUSS ION: Although CAS's decision certainly conflicts 
with the emphasis in the decisions of other CAs, there is no sharp 
conflict because no other CA has granted the government immunity 
under this statute for personal i nj ur ies. Although as Judge Gee 
pointed out, there may be some conceptual problems with the applica-
tion of CAS's rule, the rule is defensible, and the Court could let 
other CAs react to it. Judging from the 2 3 prior cases and the 
language of the statute, the immunity is more frequently invoked in 
the context of property damage. Since CAS's rule is limi. ted to 
personal injury, it is not clear that liability will be a big prob-
lem for the government. I do not think that the Court should sum-
marily reverse, because that would mean accepting the settled inter-
pretation not necessarily because it is right, but mainly because it 
is settled. 
S. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There are two responses. 
- 7 -
October 30, 1985 Morrison Opn in petn 






November 8, 1985 
Court ................... . 'l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 










G D N /l POST DI S AFF REV AFF 
..-f(~ 
· ~~·L · · · o;r~ · · · · · · · · 
• . . . .•.. . .1 . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
Burger, Ch. J .. .. ............ . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J . ... .. . .. .. .......... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... V. 
v' Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
/ Stevens, J ........................... . 




ABSEN'l' NOT VOTING 
J• 
April 10, 1986 
JAMES GINA-POW 
85-434 United States v. James etal (3 cases consolidated 
- CAS - en bane) 
MEMO TO Mike: 
This case involves an important question as to 
government immunity from damages under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act for injuries caused by the release of 
floodwaters from federal flood control projects. Two 
different such projects ar~ involved in these consolidated 
cases: the Millwood Dam and Reservoir in Arkansas, and 
the Courtableau Drainage Struction, a flood control 
project in Louisiana - both operated by the Army Corps of 
Engineers. 
Members of the Butler family were water-skiing on the 
Millwood Reservoir when the project was "in a flood 
control status", and water was being discharged from the 
reservoir through the gates of the dam - water previously 
"entrapped as part of the flood control function of the 
facility". Respondent James and Butler were water-skiing 
when the current created by discharge of the water from 
the reservoir pulled them through the dam's gates. They 




attempting to assist his wife. A somewhat similar 
accident occurred on the Courtableau Drainage Struction 
project in Louisiana when gates were opened because the 
water level "would have caused flood conditions". 
Respondents were fishing when their boat was caught in the --------- ----., 
current created by the open drainage gates, overturned and 
·----...,___...--.,...,_._ ·~-···- ----
Kenneth Clardy was drowned. 
The suits were brought against the United States 
government under the Tort Claims Act, alleging willful and 
.-~ 
gross neglect by the government in failing adequately to 
notify people, using the reservoirs for recreational 
purposes, of the danger. 
The question presented is the correct interpretation 
of §702 (c) of the Flood Control Act of 1928 provides in 
pertinent part: 
"No liability of any kind shall attach to 
or rest upon the United States for any damages 
from or by floods or flood waters at any place." 
The DCs in the Arkansas case and Louisiana cases, 
although finding that the government had been guilty of 
negligence, concluded that it was immunized by §702 (c) 
from liability for damage caused by the release of flood 






panel of CAS affirmed. It held that §702(c) consistently -
had been interpreted to bar the imposition of liability 
upon the government for damages related to flood control 
projects. 
The full Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, reversed 
the DC's judgments by a vote of 5 to 6. The essence of 
the en bane court's decision, creating an exception to 
§702{c) where the injured persons were engaged in 
recreational activities and the government failed to warn 
of the danger resulting from flood waters, is summarized 
in the court's opinion as follows: 
"The government is not liable for any fault 
of its employees in controlling floodgates or 
managing lands to contain, prevent, or manage 
floods or floodwaters. This immunity, however, 
does not extend to the fault of government 
employees in failing to warn the public of the 
existence of hazards to their accepted use of 
government-impounded water, or near6y · land. 
Because of section 702c, the government's acts 
to store, divert, and release waters to further 
flood control are subject to no risk of 
1 iabil i ty. If, however, the government allows 
people to come upon ~ those waters or nearby 
s~es of recreation, section 702c 
g rants no i mmunity ~ for government f -ault in 
creat1ng a anger or 1n aiiing to warn of 
danger to the public. If a producing cause of 
the damage or injury is a government employee's 
negligence in omissions or commissions that 
diverge from acts strictly for the purpose of 
controlling floods or floodwaters, and the 
presence or movement of water for flood control 
/ 
purposes merely furnishes a condition of the 
accident, there is no section 702c immunity." 
4. 
Judge Gee, joined by 4 other circuit judges, wrote a 
stinging dissent in which he accused the majority of 
concluding that when Congress enacted §702(c) it "did not 
mean what until today every court that has considered its 
language has concluded it did mean to say." See Pet. p. 
3ia: -- - Judge Higginbotham, in a brief two-paragraph 
separate dissent, assumed that the majority could find 
"ambiguity in the language of §702(c)", but relied on the 
fact that whatever Congress may have intended in 1928, 
over the intervening years there has been a "long-standing 
and unanimous construction placed on §702(c) by this court 
-------- ~
[CAS ] and other courts - a construction which has given ------------------
specific and unambiguous content to the clause." Although 
Judge Higginbotham did not cite the decisions he 
mentioned, the SG in his brief does this persuasively 
beginning at p. 32 of the brief. The SG also argues that 
the legislative history "confirms that §702 (c) should be 
interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning." 
On its face the opinions of the dissenting judges, 
and certainly the plain language of §702(c), would support 
reversal. Yet, it is fair to say that the brief filed by 
5. 
respondents - in which the washington firm of Onek, Klein 
& Farr had a hand in writing - makes a strong case for the 
construction adopted by the majority of the Court of 
""" Appeals. It over simplies the reasoning of respondents 
brief when I say that it argues that the 1928 flood 
control legislation was concerned only with the "nature 
and amount of property rights in the lower Mississippi 
River Valley that the government would acquire in 
connection with its flood control plan." Respondents say 
the government was not concerned with damage suits based 
on negligence by persons engaged in recreational 
activities on the waters of these projects. The immunity 
provision of §702(c) was added to provide the government a 
measure of control over the magnitude of its financial 
commitments. That section was intended to protect the 
government from damages to property that would not rise to 
the level of a constitutional taking (requiring 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment) • Respondents 
further argue that even if 702(c) can be read as 
prohibiting ordinary tort claims for negligently caused 
damages, it has no applicability to the facts of this case 
because respondents 1 claims arise from the government 1 s 
6. 
mismanagement of recreational activities that have nothing 
------------____...........~~~~-
to do with flood control. 
!'""-- .,_______._,. 
Pursuing this line of argument, respondents brief 
states that their clients assumed the risk of losses 
occasioned by the government's mishandling of flood 
control activities, but "did not assume any comparable 
risk with respect to losses caused by recreational 
activities or other conduct neither related nor necessary 
to flood control." ( Br. 9) . 
* * * 
I would 1 ike a bobtail bench memo from my clerk. 
One's sympathy would tend to support affirmance, whereas 
clearly the language of §702 (c) is about as explicit as 
one could write it to preclude liability by the government 
for activities under the Flood Control Act under any and 
all circumstances. Moreover, there is a great deal to 
Judge Higginbotham's view that in light of the uniform 
construction - particularly by courts of appeals - since 
1928, a change in this construction should be left to 
Congress and not made by the judiciary. 
LFP, JR. 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 85-434, United States v. James 
(To be argued Monday, April 21st) 
I. QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 
Whether those engaging in recreation who suffered personal injury 
caused by flood-control waters may recover under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act even though the Flood Control Act specifies that "[n]o 
liability of any kind shall attach to ••. the United States for 
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place," 33 
u.s.c. §702c? 
II. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOH 
See attached pool memo. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
Section 702c of title 33 of the u.s. Code provides: 
"No liability of any kind shall attach to or 
rest upon the United Statues for any damage 
from or by floods or flood waters at any 
place: Provided, however, That if in carrying 
out the purposes of [various other sections 
of the title] it shall be found that upon any 
stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River 
it is impracticable to construct levees •.• , 
and lands in such stretch [will be newly] 
subjected to overflow and damage .•• by rea-
son of the construction of levees on the op-
posite banks of the river it shall be the 
duty of the ••• United States Government to 
acquire either the absolute ownership of the 
lands so subjected to overflow and damage or 
floodage rights over such lands." 
This provision was passed in 1928. 
1. Just Don't Ask Us About Philadelphia Gear, Okay?: The Govern-
ment's Position 
The government's argument is easy to summarize: read the 
statute. A personal-injury suit is brought for damages, and is 
thus for "any damage." The waters causing the injury here were 
flowing because of the government's effort to reduce the possi-
bility of flooding, and were thus "flood waters." The reservoir 
was a place, and thus was "any place." Under these conditions, 
"[n] o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the 
United States." Sovereign immunity is therefore not only not 
waived, but expressly preserved. 
- 3 -
I find it somewhat difficult to comment on the government's 
argument. They quote the statute correctly, and their interpre-
tation accords with my understanding of words like "any." Clear-
ly, then, the respondents "bear the burden" of showing that this 
statute should not be taken at face value. 
2. Did Chief Justice Marshall Decide Marbury Just By Reading the 
Statute?: The Respondents' Position 
The respondents' argument is, of necessity, more subtle than 
the government's position. It consists of three separate attacks 
seeking to undermine the government's plain-meaning argument. 
a. Structure and Pre-Enactment History 
The respondents' first argument is that §702c is simply a 
part of a compromise on how much property the government was to 
acquire in connection with its flood-control activities, and is 
therefore not about any other kind of immunity. According to 
respondents, one side in the legislative struggle wanted compen-
sation to owners for all manner of damages or costs involved in 
the start-up of the program, while the other side wanted to pay 
out only to the extent required to do so by the Takings Clause. 
The proviso of §702c, which treats land affected by levees on the 
opposite bank, and §702d, which commits the government to 
purhcase certain "flowage rights" on property near the river, 
were the extent of the government's committment to compensation; 
- 4 -
the pre-proviso portion of §702c simply emphasizes that the gov-
ernment is not liable for any other damages. 
As part of this argument, respondents also place some weight 
on the fact that, in 1928, the fact that the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA) was almost 20 years in the future meant that the gov-
ernment in 1928 had immunity against personal-injury suits even 
if Congress hadn't said so in §702c. Resps argues that §702c 
would therefore be superfluous if it were interpreted as barring 
personal-injury suits. 
Respondents' argument on this point strikes me as an excel-
lent explanation of why Congress might have chosen to place the 
immunity provision where it did, but I do not see it as explain-
ing decisively what Congress meant by what it put there. The 
choice of language is difficult to square with anything except an 
intention to exempt the broadest possible scope of outcomes from 
those for which the government might otherwise be liable. The 
statute doesn't immunize the government from liability for "prop-
erty damages," for example, but from "any damage," and therefore 
the respondent's argument that compensation for property was all 
that §702c was meant to reach falls short. Similarly, the stat-
ute prevents the imposition of "liability of any kind" upon the 
government, not "liability for flooded property." 
In addition, there is at least one sense in which the re-
spondents' argument prove too much. Respondents implicitly 
thinks that all Congress was concerned about in passing §702c was 
what would happen to property immediately after flood-control 
projects were constructed--under respondents' view, property that 
- 5 -
got flooded was not to be paid for by the government except when 
the flooding resulted in a constitutional taking or fell within 
the proviso. But the courts, at least, have also interpreted the 
statute to cover what happens when, with flood-control measures 
long in place, there is damage when those measures are over-
whelmed by nature. In other words, the courts have not inter-
preted the measure as covering only damage to property from the 
construction of the levees and dams, despite the fact that re-
spondents' arguments would so limit §702c immunity. 
As to the argument that the 1928 no-FTCA backdrop would make 
§702c superfluous if interpreted to cover personal injury, there 
seems to me a slight flaw in respondents' logic. If the govern-
ment argued that the immunity provision was designed only to cov-
er personal injuries, then respondents would have a telling 
point. But the government argues that the government intended to 
forestall lots of suits, among those suits for personal injury. 
Under respondents' view of inferring congressional intent, a po-
sition like the petitioner's could prevail only if Congress were 
prescient: Congress would have to say something like, "We want to 
immunize the government from all suits, and even if we pass a 
later statute generally waiving liability with respect to some 
subset of suits [e.g., torts], we still want to immunize govern-
ment from all suits resulting from floods or flood waters." 
This way of looking at respondents' superfluity argument 
does, however, lead me to a different, and perhaps more useful, 
way of thinking about the case. Assume that, whether because of 
the prevailing state of sovereign immunity or because of a flood-
- 6 -
specific desire, the 1928 Congress contemplated that, after §702c 
was passed, there would be no governmental liability for personal 
injuries stemming from floods or flood-control waters. It is 
historical fact that the 1948 Congress then came along and passed 
the FTCA, which provides: 
"The United States shall be liable, respect-
ing the provisions of this title relating to 
tort claims, in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances, but shall not be liable 
for interest prior to judgment or for puni-
tive damages." 28 u.s.c. §2674. 
See also 28 u.s.c. §1346(b) (giving federal district courts ex-
elusive jurisdiction on claims "for injury or loss of property, 
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful 
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances 
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to 
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the 
act or omission occurred"). The 1948 Congress therefore seems to 
have contemplated a generalized waiver of governmental immunity 
from personal-injury suits. 
In addition, while the FTCA does have an entire section on 
exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity (that is, an en-
tire section setting forth what remains immune from suit even 
after passage of the FTCA) for such things as quarantines and 
actions of the TVA, see 28 u.s.c. §2680, this section does not 
mention flood-control activities. One might infer from this si-
lence that, even if the 1928 Act was intended to give the US im-
munity from suits for personal injury caused by flood waters, the 
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1948 Congress, in enacting the FTCA and omitting any mention of 
flood-control activities, did intend to waive the immunity of the 
United States in cases like this one. 
Finally, the FTCA excepts "discretionary functions" from 
the waiver, and an accompanying committee report states: 
"This is a highly important exception, in-
tended to preclude any poss ibi 1 i ty that the 
bill might be construed to authorize suit for 
damages against the Government growing out of 
an authorized activity, such as a flood con-
trol or irrigation project, where no negli-
gence on the party of any Government agent is 
shown " H. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 5-6 (1946). 
Respondent argues that this passage suggests that liability for 
non-discretionary functions might exist for flood-related activi-
ties by the government, since the passage states that the discre-
tionary-functions exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity 
is designed to safeguard flood-control activities from liability, 
and therefore implies that some liability exists. _ 
Respondents' position therefore has a good deal going for 
it. If a later Congress comes along and does something incon-
sistent with an earlier Congress, the later Congress is generally 
presumed to know the background against which it legislates, and 
might therefore be presumed to have intended to overrule the pre-
vious state of affairs. Nonetheless, even this sensible view is 
probably not the most directly applicable legal principle here: 
"It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute 
dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not sub-
merged [!] by a later enacted statute covering a mre generalized 
spectrum." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 u.s. 148, 153 
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(1976). So if "flood control" is a "narrow, precise, and specif-
ic subject," then the FTCA's generalized provisions waiving immu-
nity against personal-injury suits do not override §702c's provi-
sion setting forth immunity against all suits involving flood 
control. Nonetheless, respondents' case still breathes, since at 
least §702c was not by its terms only about personal-injury 
suits. 
I note also that the FTCA is a waiver of sovereign immunity, 
and such waivers are to be construed narrowly. If one adopts the 
converse of this proposition and construes broadly statutes set-
ting forth immunity, then you have even more weight in the bal-
ance pan on the goverment's side. 
b. If Ketchup Is A Vegetable , Maybe Water Skiers Are Mini-Dams 
The second and related argument of respondents is that, for 
the legislative~context reasons set forth as supporting respond-
ents' first argument, §702c has nothing to do with injuries aris-
ing from recreational activities. 
The first sub-argument here notes the "fundamental princi-
ple of immunity doctrine that the sphere of protected [governmen-
tal] activity must be narrowly limited by the purpose for which 
the immunity was granted." Brief for Respondents James and But-
ler 9. This statement, of course, is exactly backwards: it is a 
fundamental principle of immunity doctrine that the sphere of 
governmental activity ~rotected by immunity must be narrowly 
limited. Express waiver is necessary. I think, therefore, that 
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the Court is obliged to interpret broadly a stutute setting forth 
immunity with a generous helping of sweeping "any"'s in its 
terms. The exclusion of recreational activities from the mind of 
Congress when its voice was so clear does not, therefore, seem to 
me much help to petitioners. 
The second sub-argument here is made by respondent Clardy, 
who points to some precedents holding the government liable when 
a facility with both flood-control and other purposes has led to 
the damages at issue, and then concludes that the mere involve-
ment of a flood-control facility in the proceeding does not immu-
nize the government from suit. Since recreation is a non-flood-
control purpose of the facility involved here, and since the gov-
ernment's encouragement of recreation led to the injuries suf-
fered here, the government is liable. 
I would find this argument much more convincing if a gov-
ernment inspector, putt-putting out on the lake to see whether 
respondents had used federally acceptable levels of water-ski 
wax, had negligently left a huge trail of red tape in his or her 
wake in which a hapless swimmer became entangled and then 
drowned. But here it is impossible to argue that flood-control 
waters were not the cause of the injury, and therefore §702c has 
to apply to the situation here if it is applicable to any person-
al injuries. If the government stated that it was immune from 
all injuries caused by postal trucks, and someone on the way into 
the Post Office to buy stamps got hit by a postal truck, would 
the government be liable? The sale of stamps by the government 
may be a but-for cause of the accident, but so is the truck; I 
- 10 -
have no trouble concluding that the government is immune so long 
as the condition that it lists in the statute is a but-for cause 
of the accident even if it is not the only but-for cause of the 
accident. Whether other governmental action is also a but-for 
cause of the accident is a matter of happenstance, not liability. 
c. When Congress Wanted To Limit Something to the Mississippi 
River Valley, They Knew How To Spell "Mississippi" 
Respondents' third argument is that, whatever §702c says, 
that section does not apply to the particular reservoir at issue 
with respect to respondents James and Butler. {This third argu-
ment is not made by respondent Clardy, whose husband and son were 
injured by waters from a different project than that where James 
and Butler were hurt.) Section 702c is part of the flood-control 
act of 1928 that authorized projects in the Mississippi River 
Valley; the Millwood Reservoir where James and Butler were in-
jured is in the Red-Ouachita River Basis project authorized in 
the 1946 Flood Control Act, and the Millwood Reservoir was in-
cluded within that project in the 1958 Act. Respondents argue 
that §702c was only needed for the Mississippi projects because 
only there was the government taking on any possibility of prop-
erty-damage liability and thus only there was there the need to 
disclaim liability beyond that set forth in the §702c proviso and 
§702d. {I note that it is unclear whether respondents raised 
this argument below.) 
Respondents also argue that there are different, narrower 
immunity provisions in a 1936 Act that would be superfluous if 
- 11 -
§702c applied in all its breadth to all flood-control projects. 
Respondent acknowledges that the 1936 Act states that it "shall 
[not] be construed as repealing or amending any provision of [the 
1928 Flood Control Act]," 33 u.s.c. §70le, but this simply means 
that projects on the Mississippi are not affected by the 1936 
Act, not that the 1928 Act applies to the projects authorized in 
the 1936 Act. In addition, the 1946 Act does not have any lan-
guage similar to §70le, and thus even if projects authorized by 
the 1936 Act are subject to §702c there is no reason to think 
that projects authorized by the 1946 Act are subject to §702c. 
I think that the fact that the 1946 Act has no immunity 
provisions in it is quite consistent with §702c being a general-
ized grant of immunity, since Congress would then not be obliged 
to repeat §702c over and over. And as the government's reply 
brief states, §702c extends the immunity to flood waters "at any 
place," not just on the Mississippi. When Congress wanted to 
-
limit a provision to the Mississippi River projects, it said so, 
as in the proviso of §702c itself. The "narrower" provisions of 
the 1936 Act are indeed narrower, since they apply by their terms 
only to "damages due to the construction works" rather than to 




I think that the plain language of §702c should prevail 
here, and therefore recommend reversal. Congress chose the 
broadest possible phrasing for the statute. That statute was 
setting forth a governmental immunity and therefore should, at 
least if one can apply the converse of the normal rule that waiv-
ers of sovereign immunity are to construed narrowly, be construed 
broadly even if its language were not so sweeping. Nonetheless, 
I remain slightly worried by the later passage of the FTCA; per-
haps oral argument will clear up this last point. 
Setear 






VI. SUGGESTED QUESTIONS 
For the Petr: 
1. After Congress passed §702c governing damages resulting 
from flood waters, it passed the Federal Tort Claims Act allowing 
suits for personal injury? Why shouldn't we give dispositive 
weight to the later act of Congress here and therefore allow a 
suit for personal injury? 
For the Resp: 
1. Why haven't you argued that the Federal Tort Claims Act 
implicitly repealed §702c so far as personal injuries are con-
cerned? 
2. Isn't the statutory language here awfully broad? It 
states that there shall be no liability of ~kind for ~dam­
age at~ place. Why did Congress choose such sweeping terms if 
it inte~d only narrow role you ascribe to §702c? 
3. If we accept your argument that §702c was only meant to 
cover flooding that resulted from the construction of dams and 
levees, wouldn't we be allowing recovery against the government 




To: Mr. Justice Powell April 19, 1986 
From: Mike 
No. 85-434 United States v. Charlotte James, et al. 
Date: April 11, 1986 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether 33 u.s.c. §702c, which provides that "[n]o li-
ability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United 
States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any 
place," bars respondents from recovering damages under the Feder-
al Tort Claims Act for injuries allegedly caused by the release 








I believe that it will be helpful to discuss the argu-
ments made by the parties, particularly si.nce the respondents are 
not relying on the reasoning of the courts below. I will proceed 
1 
in this discussion by presenting each argument of the SG followed 
immediately by the resps' counter-argument, before presenting the 
next argument of the SG. 
1. The Plain Language of the Statute 
The SG's first, and central argument is that the plain 
language of the statute clearly indicates that no liability shall 
attack for injuries caused by the government's flood control ac-
tivities. It further contends that the injury in this case was 
caused by release of flood waters, and therefore is barred by 33 
u.s.c. §702c, which retains federal sovereign immunity over "any 
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place." In order 
to make this argument, the SG goes no further than the language 
of the statute, which on its face certainly does seem to bar this 
claim. He notes that "[w)hen ... the terms of a statute [are] 
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in rare and 
exceptional circumstances." Rubin v. United States, 449 u.s. 
424, 430 (1981). See also Board of Governors v. Dimension Finan-
cial Corp., No. 84-1274 slip. op. 6 (Jan. 22, 1986) ("If the 
statute is clear and unambiguous • that is the end of the mat-
ter.'") 
The resps, particularly resps James and Butler (the Onek, 
Klein brief) give two reasons for looking past the plain language 
of the statute. ----- The first is that §702c is ambiguous because within the same subsection, as well as other sections of the same 
act, Congress provided for some forms of liability. The proviso 
of §702c provides for liability for acquisition of overflow 
rights. Section 702d committed the government to purchase "flow-
age rights" to certain properties located in or near proposed 
diversions from the river. Because these sections provide for 
--------------------~4-----
some government liability almost "in the same breath" as §702c's 
immunity provision, resps contend that it is not necessary to ----- -·. _...--..... 
view §702c as providing absolute immunity. Therefore, resps con-
tend that the Court must look past the language of the statute in 
order to determine just how much immunity Congress intended by 
§702c. 
For reasons that differ from the SG' s argument, I con-
clude that the language of the statute controls. Resps bear the 
------------~~ ---
burden of overcoming the strong presumption that the straightfor-
ward language of the statute is not as broad as it appears. The 
proviso . of section 702c and the liability provision of §702d do 
create some ambiguity. But resps, as I will demonstrate later, -
are unsuccessful in creating an alternative meaning for §702c 
-----------------~-------------------from the legislative history. For that reason, I conclude that 
they have failed to rebut the presumption that the plain language 
of the statute controls. "The plain purpose of legislation 
is determined in the first instance with reference to the plain 
language of the statute itself." Dimension Financial, slip op. 
at 12. Stated differently, resps have posited sufficient reason 
c:--
for looking beyond the words of the statute. But, once the words 
"" · ".J0 of the statute are traversed, they do not present anything from 
the legislative history that "point[s] 










, .. . 
'. 
swer" and therefore they have not met their burden of providing 
"substantial support for limiting language that Congress itself 
chose not to 1 imi t. " St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Barry, 438 u.s. 531, 550 (1978). 
2. The Legislative History 
Both sides make extensive arguments based on legislative 
history. Rather than attempting to set out in detail the support 
for each side's legislative history argument, I will only summa-
rize their positions briefly. Resps (particularly the Onek, 
Klein brief) first argue that section 702c was drafted, along 
with other provisions, as the House response to an overly gener-
ous provision in the Senate version of the bill. Section 4 of 
the Senate version would have required the United States to ac-
quire ownership interest in a lot of land near the Mississippi, 
including a great deal of land owned by railroads. The House 
rejected that version, and substituted its own, much more limited 
requirements, found in the proviso and in §407d. Resps argue 
that §702c's immunity language was inserted as part of the House 
effort to limit liability for property damage and property acqui-
sition, and that it was only intended to ensure that "the govern-
ment, and only the government, would determine how much of these 
property rights to acquire, and when to acquire them." Onek, 
Klein Br. at 27. My own reading of the legislative hist~ indi-
cates that the immunity language of §702c was a completely sepa-------rat e---,l,....,S::-os::-:u=-=-e=--:;i~n=--7t;:h-:e~l:;-e:-g-:;i-:::s~l-=-a t i ve debates from the p r ov i so and from ----- -
§702d. The immunity language was not intended as a response to 
the Senate version of the bill. Its inclusion with amendments 
r-J- --
that were intended to replace section 4 of the Senate bill was 
just the sort of coincidence or fortuity that occurs all the time 
in Congress. The immunity language was passed unanimously with-
out discussion; the proviso and section 702d both were hotly de-
bated. 
Both the SG and the resps make a variety of arguments as 
to what the legislative history does indicate. For example, 
resps question why Congress would include an immunity provision 
when existing law protected them with complete sovereign immuni-
ty. The SG responds by noting that Congress was simply being 
extra-cautious on the eve of an enormous undertaking; see ~, 
69 Cong. Rec. 7028 (1928) ("While it is wise to insert that pro-
vision in the bill, it is not necessary, because the Supreme 
Court of the United States has decided ••• that the Government 
is not liable for any of these damages." (remarks of Rep. Spear-
ing); see also Pet. app. 35a n.4 (Gee, J., dissenting) (noting 
that Congress was simply "driving down a clear stake in such a 
dangerous area"). I do not find any of the various explanations 
of the legislative history very convincing, but the short answer, 
as I noted above, is that resps bear the burden of demonstrating -
that Congress intended something other than what it said in the 
language of the statute. I conclude that they have not met that 
burden. 
ts of causation 
argue that this is not truly damage from "flood 
control activities," but is merely negligent management of a 
recreation facility and subject to liability under the Federal 
·. 
Tort Claims Act. I agree that the government cannot claim immu-
ni ty for any and all activity that is merely associated wi tJ a 
flood control project. But the accidents here, in my view, were 
sufficiently connected to the government's flood control respon-
sibilities to come under the liability provision. It was not the 
sort of accident that is totally unconnected from the govern- I 
ment' s flood control efforts. If, for example, the government 
ran a marina and someone fell through a negligently constructed 
dock, §702c would not make the government immune from damages. 
But in this case, the government had to make a decision whether 
to release water from a dam. It is not unusual in the West that 
such decisions often involve protecting the integrity of the dam 
structure itself. Such decisions also may have to be made with 
1 i ttle time for warning. While in this case it appears that 
there was adequate time to give warning, it nevertheless comes 
within the general category of cases that are sufficiently caus-
ally related to flood control activities that the immunity provi-
sion applies. Resps pose difficult hypotheticals that stretch 
the concept of causation to its limit. Those cases are not be-
fore the Court, however, and it is not surprising that the some-
times fuzzy concept of tort causation does not lend itself to a 
bright line. 
4. Is §702c limited to the 1928 Flood Control Act? 
Resps make one argument that I find troubling. They con-
tend that Congress only intended to apply §702c to the 1928 Flood 
-=-
Control Act and subsequent amendments, and that the James/Butler 
c:;_- ---=-
accident occurred on a reservoir that was not a part of the 1928 
r:--J- . -
Act or any subsequent amendment. The SG argues that nothing in 
the statute limits its application to the 1928 Act. I find that 
Statutes are not normally presumed to 
have application outside the context of their enactment. In ad-
dition, resps point out that some subsequent flood control acts 
had their own, slightly different immunity provisions. I suggest 
that this would be a fruitful area for questioning at oral argu-




It is unfortunate that the government would insist on 
cloaking itself with immunity from damages in these tragic cases 
involving only small amounts of damages. The government, howev-
er, has reason to fear that it could be liable for enormous dam-
ages in the future if it loses immunity for flood control activi-
ties. At least as to flood control projects that come und~r the ----------------
1928 Act, I conclude that §702c preserves the government's sover-
~ 
eign immunity from liability for any damages to resps • 
. . 
~~1-i--. ~ '!/11 
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lfp/ss 05/20/86 JAMES SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Cabell DATE: May 20, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-434 u.s. v. James 
As I recall, your time table for producing a 
draft in this case was the end of this week. I could 
hardly believe, therefore, that a 23-page draft was 
forthcoming today! Did you really attend the wedding in 
Williamsburg, and - in view of your capital case plus this 
opinion - did you get any sleep the last couple of nights? 
Whatever the explanation, I do appreciate your moving with 
"all deliberate speed", and I have now read the draft with 
interest. 
Apart from some stylistic editing, I think the 
first 13 pages are excellent. My problems with Part II 
that beg ins on page 13, may result in part from my not 
having refreshed my recollection as to the arguments in 
this case. Nevertheless, as those who read our opinion 
will be even less familiar than I am, the draft should be 
clearly understandable on its face. I do not think Part 
II quite measures up to this requirement. 
2. 
My general impressions are that Part II is 
unnecessarily long and to some extent perhaps repetitious. 
It also seems to me that respondents' arguments relating 
to the "proviso" are confusing. My "confusion" does not 
commence, however, until the first paragraph on p. 16. Up 
to that point, Part II is fine. As suggested by my 
scribbling in the margin on p. 16, it seems to me that the . 
second and third sentences in this paragraph could be 
omitted, leaving the first sentence on p. 16 as the 
opening sentence in the paragraph that begins on p. 17. 
You address the proviso of §702c, and §702d 
for the first time on p. 18. From that point on, I find 
it difficult to follow the draft. You have endeavored to 
state fairly the arguments of both classes of respondents, 
but my impression is that we could be fair without writing 
at such length. In view of the plain language and 
legislative history, and your disposition of the ambiguity 
argument, there is little substance left to respondents' 
arguments. 
It would help, at least for me, if Part II had 
subparts containing the respective arguments of the two 
classes of respondents. At the beginning of Part II, you 
could - as I believe you have - state the common argument 
-'· 
with respect to the ambiguity of the statute. Thereafter, 
although there is some overlapping, somewhat different 
arguments seem to be made. If I am right, this would 
justify the use of subparts as an aid to clarity. 
Finally, responding to your inquiry as to whether 
we should mention the argument by the Arkansas respondents 
that §702 does not apply to them, I suggest a footnote 
that rejects this argument as briefly as you can. The 
short answer to the argument is that the language of §702c 
is not limited to the Louisiana dam, and that no decision 
has ever so held. Moreover, it would be unreasonable to 
assume that Congress intended a different level of 
liability at one of these projects from that which exists 
at all others. 
* * * 
If this memorandum seems unduly negative, I do 
not so intend it. I think you have "wrought a miracle" in 
producing a draft so quickly, and it has been helpful for 
me to have it early this week. I merely suggest, in 
effect, that you now spend another day or two if necessary 





lfp/ss 05/21/86 JAM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Cabell DATE: May 21, 1986 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-434 United States v. James 
As you indicated to me in explaining your outline 
of the facts, one could understand why CA5 - en bane -
struggled to find some way to avoid the plain language of 
§702c. 
Perhaps at the end of our opinion, we might 
include some hortatory language along the following lines: 
"As the facts in this case demonstrate, one can 
well understand why the Court of Appeals sought to find a 
principled way of holding the Government responsible for 
its concededly negligent conduct. For the reasons stated 
above, we nevertheless conclude that the Court is 
obligated to follow the plain language of §702c a 
section of the 1928 Act that received careful 
consideration by Congress and that has remained unchanged 
for nearly 60 years. If a change is to be made, it should 




Cabell: Again I appreciate your moving so 
promptly to provide me with a first draft that gives us -
and me in particular - more adequate time to consider this 












From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: May 2 8 , 19 8 6 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-434 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
CHARLOTTE JAMES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1986] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the immunity pro-
vision in 33 U. S. C. § 702c, which states that "[n]o liability of 
any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for 
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place," 
bars recovery where the Federal Government would other-
wise be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2671 et seq., for personal injury caused by the Federal Gov-
ernment's negligent failure to warn of the dangers from the 
release of flood waters from federal flood control projects. 
I 
The present case arose from serious accidents at flood con-
trol projects in Arkansas and Louisiana. In both accidents, 
recreational users of the reservoirs were swept through 
retaining structures when those structures were opened to 
release waters in order to control flooding. 
A 
The project in Arkansas, Millwood Dam, was dedicated in 
1966 and is located in the southwestern corner of the State. 
The Millwood Reservoir behind the structure is used for 
fishing, swimming, boating, and water-skiing. This reser-
voir has marinas and launching areas for small boats. The 
United States Government Printing Office has printed 
-
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brochures that promote the recreational features of the 
project and encourage the public to water-ski at the Millwood 
Reservoir. 
Enormous portals set within the Millwood Dam, called 
"tainter gates," allow the discharge of water from the Reser-
voir into a spilling basin below. On June 8, 1979, the level of 
the Reservoir was such that the United States Corps of Engi-
neers designated it at "flood stage." As part of the flood 
control function of the Millwood facility, the Corps of Engi-
neers began to release water through the tainter gates. 
This release created a swift, strong current toward the 
underwater discharge. 
Respondents Charlotte James and Kathy Butler, who were 
water-skiing in that area because the water appeared to be 
calm, fell and began drifting toward the tainter gates. Re-
spondents' husbands, who were operating the ski boat, cir-
cled back to give them the tow lines, apparently intending to 
pull them away from danger. Tr. 20-21, 166-167. Because 
of the swift currents, respondents were unable to hold on to 
the lines. Ibid. The husbands' attempts to pull respond-
ents aboard by hand also failed because each time the current 
pulled the skiers out of reach. I d., at 21. Eddy Butler then 
dove into the water in an attempt to save his wife, but all 
three were pulled through the tainter gates. He drowned, 
and respondents James and Butler were injured. The boat, 
still occupied by Mr. James and his daughter Sonja, became 
lodged in the tainter gates, and the occupants were rescued 
without injury. 
Respondents James and Butler filed suit in the U. S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Texas against the 
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. After a bench trial, the 
court in an unreported opinion found that a cable strung with 
orange buoys delineating the area of danger near the tainter 
gates had broken and drifted away; that white anchor buoys 
marking a restricted area near the Dam were also out of place 
: 
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and consequently offered no warning to a reasonably prudent 
user; that the United States "knew that the dangerous condi-
tion created would result in injury to those situated as [were 
respondents James and Butler] if an adequate warning was 
not given"; and that respondents James and Butler were not 
negligent. The court assessed damages at $1 million for re-
spondent Butler, and $40,000 for respondent James, stating 
that the case went "beyond gross negligence" and "consti-
tute[d] a classic classroom example of a death and injuries 
resulting from conscious governmental indifference to the 
safety of the public." App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. At the 
same time, however, the court concluded that although Fed-
eral Government agents had willfully and even maliciously 
failed to warn of a known danger, the Federal Government 
was immune from damages under 33 U. S. C. § 702c, a stat-
ute left unrepealed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 60 
Stat. 842, 846-847 (listing statutes specifically revoked by 
FTCA). The court accordingly denied relief. 
B 
The relevant flood control project in Louisiana, the 
Cortableau Drainage Structure, is located near the West 
Atchafalaya Basin. On May 17, 1980, the waters in the res-
ervoir of Bayou Courtableau Basin were at flood stage, and 
consequently the Corps of Engineers opened the gates in the 
project. This created a strong current. Kenneth Clardy 
and his father, Joseph Clardy, were fishing in the Basin. 
Only two faded signs at the entrance of the drainage struc-
ture warned of the dangerous current. The boaters could 
not see the signs until they already had been swept past. 
The boat became disabled and was drawn through the open 
gates of the spillway. Kenneth Clardy was thrown into the 
approach basin and drowned while being pulled through a 
220-foot-long barrel of the drainage structure. 1 His father 
'The District Court incorrectly identified Joseph Clardy as the dece-
dent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a-61a. 
85-434-0PINION 
4 UNITED STATES v. JAMES 
survived without injury. 
Respondent Susan Clardy, Kenneth Clardy's wife, com-
menced an action in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana seeking damages under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Corps of Engi-
neers failed to post adequate warnings of the danger from the 
current caused by the open gates. The Federal Government 
conceded that it negligently failed to warn the decedent. 
The District Court found, however, that under Graci v. 
United States, 456 F. 2d 20 (CA5 1971), and Florida East 
Coast R. Co. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 1184 (CA5 1975),2 
the United States was immune under § 702c from damages 
for personal injury caused by floods or flood waters in the 
negligent operation of flood control projects. The court 
found further that the Federal Government's action was 
within the scope of § 702c because "the gates were opened to 
prevent flooding and inundation landside of the drainage 
structure." App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court accord-
ingly granted summary judgment for the United States. 
c 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the 
cases on appeal, and a panel affirmed. 740 F. 2d 365 (1984). 
2 In Graci v. United States , 456 F. 2d 20 (CA5 1971), property owners in 
Louisiana brought suit for flooding allegedly caused by negligent design in 
the Mississippi River Gulf Channel Outlet, a navigation project that pro-
vided a shortcut from the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans. The Federal 
Government contended that § 702c granted immunity from damages caused 
by any flood waters, even those unconnected with flood control projects. 
The court rejected this argument, and held that the provision conferred 
immunity only for floods or flood waters connected with a flood control 
project. 
In Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. United States , 519 F. 2d 1184 
(CA5 1975), the court denied recovery to a railroad after its tracks near a 
central Florida flood control project were washed out by heavy rains. The 
court rejected arguments that the immunity provision did not cover losses 
caused or aggravated by the Federal Government's own negligence, and 
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The panel examined the legislative history of § 702c and con-
cluded that Congress intended the provision to disclaim only 
"liability for 'takings' and not liability for consequential dam-
ages." !d., at 373. Nevertheless, the panel affirmed both 
judgments from the District Courts, believing itself bound by 
the Circuit's earlier interpretation of the section in Graci, 
supra, and Florida East Coast Railway, supra. See n. 2, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals reheard the case en bane and re-
versed the District Courts' judgments. 760 F. 2d 590 
(19852;, The court determined that § 702c contained "latent 
ambiguities" that could be resolved only by reference to the 
legislative history. !d., at 594. Analyzing that history, the 
court stated that in enacting § 702c as part of the Flood Con-
trol Act of 1928, "Congress was concerned with allocating the 
costs of a major public works program between the federal 
government and the state and local interests, both public and 
private, in the wake of a financial, administrative, and engi-
neering debacle [from the great Mississippi River flood of 
1927]." I d., at 596. Departing from the panel's reading of 
§ 702's legislative history, the en bane court concluded that 
Congress intended § 702c to immunize the Federal Govern-
ment from liability for damage resulting directly from con-
struction of flood control projects and from liability for flood-
ing caused by factors beyond the Government's control, but l 
that Congress had not intended "to shield the negligent or 
wrongful acts of government employees-either in the con-
struction or in the continued operation" of flood control 
projects, including the failure "to warn the public of the 
existence of hazards to their accepted use of government-im-
pounded water, or nearby land." !d., at 599, 603. 
Judge Gee, in dissent, argued that the holding was con-
trary to "the statute's plain words," id. , at 604, and that 
that "washouts" caused by the rapid runoff of surface water were not 
"flood" damage. 
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"[b]oth the language of § 702c and the legislative history 
[were] entirely consistent with a purpose in the Congress, 
poised over a half-century ago on the brink of entry into a 
massive public works program-one of then unprecedented 
scope and laden with foreseeable and unforeseeable prospects 
of liability-to state clearly that the federal treasury was to 
be placed at risk by it no further than was required by the 
Constitution," id., at 605-606. He noted that this construc-
tion was the unanimous view of previous Courts of Appeals 
that had construed § 702c, and that it "has stood for three 
decades without any sign of Congressional dissatisfaction." 
ld., at 606. 3 
We granted certiorari to resolve the resultant split among 
the Circuits. 4 474 U. S. -- (1985). We now reverse. 
II 
The starting point in statutory interpretation is "the 
language of the statute itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concur-
ring). "[W]e assume that the legislative purpose is ex-
pressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." Amer-
3 Judge Higginbotham filed a separate dissenting opinion stating that 
"[w]ithout clear evidence of what Congress meant to do in 1928, I would 
defer to the longstanding and unanimous constuction placed on § 702c by 
this and other courts .... " 760 F. 2d, at 606-607. 
'All other Courts of Appeals that have interpreted § 702c-and, prior to 
this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seen. 2, supra--have 
held that § 702c grants immunity to the Federal Government from damages 
caused by flood waters from a flood control project. See, e. g., Portis v. 
Folk Construction Co., 694 F. 2d 520, 522 (CAS 1982) (purpose of§ 702c is 
"to assure the government of absolute immunity for [damages caused by 
flooding related to] flood control projects"); Morici Corp. v. United States, 
681 F. 2d 645, 647-648 (CA9 1982) ("if [the plaintiff's] injury resulted from 
the operation of [a] federal project for flood control purposes, government 
immunity is complete"); Callaway v. United States, 568 F . 2d 684, 686-687 
(CAlO 1978) (rejecting arguments that § 702c does not apply to flood dam-
ages resulting from the operation of a flood control project in view of 
"broad and emphatic language of§ 702c"); Parks v. United States, 370 F. 
2d 92, 93 (CA2 1966) (same). 
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ican Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). The 
immunity provision in § 702c, enacted as part of the Flood 
Control Act of 1928, outlines immunity in sweeping terms: 
"No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the 
United States for any damage from or by floods or flood wa-
ters at any place." 33 U.S. C. §702c (emphasis added). It 
is difficult to imagine broader language. 5 
On its face, this language covers the accidents at issue 
here. Respondents' injuries occurred as a result of the 
release of waters from reservoirs that had reached flood 
stage. Given the nature of the accidents at issue, and given 
the plain terms of the statute, "it requires some ingenuity to 
create ambiguity." Rothschild v. United States, 179 U. S. 
463, 465 (1900). Cf. TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 173, n. 18 
(1978) (assertions of ambiguity do not transform a clear stat-
ute into an ambiguous provision). 
Although the Court of Appeals found, for example, that 
the word "damage" was ambiguous because it might refer 
only to damage to property and exclude damage to persons, 
760 F. 2d, at 594, and n. 7, the ordinary meaning of the word 
carries no such limitation. Damages "have historically been 
awarded both for injury to property and injury to the per-
son-a fact too well-known to have been overlooked by the 
Congress .... " American Stevedores, Inc. v. Parella, 330 
U. S. 446, 450 (1947). 6 Moreover, Congress' choice of the 
5 As Judge Gee noted in dissent, any effort to devise a provision that 
more plainly rules out liability "serves small purpose beyond making the 
enactment read like an insurance company's fonn [of] general release 
rather than a statute." 760 F. 2d 590, 604 (1985). Respondents conceded 
as much at oral argument: "I don't believe that [§ 702c] could have been 
more expansive ['in its absolute tenns']." Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. 
5 Damages means "loss due to ... injury or hann to person, property, 
or reputation." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 571 (1961); 
Black's Law Dictionary 351 (5th ed. 1979). Damages carried the same 
meaning at the time § 702c was enacted. See 4 J. Sutherland, Law of 
Damages §§ 1241-1252 (4th ed. 1916); 2 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages 
§§ 573-574a (9th ed. 1912). 
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language "any damage" and "liability of any kind" further 
undercuts a narrow construction. @nphasis added) ~ 
Nor do the terms "flood" and "fl~dwaters" create any un-
certainty in the context of accidents such as the ones at issue 
in these cases. The Act concerns flood control projects de-
signed to carry flood waters. It is thus clear from § 702c's 
plain language that the terms "flood" and "floodwaters" apply 
to all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood 
control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as 
well as to waters that such projects cannot control. As both 
District Courts found, the waters here clearly fall within the 
ambit of the statute. 7 
III 
We have repeatedly recognized that "[ w ]hen ... the terms 
of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, 
except 'in "rare and exceptional circumstances.""' Rubin v. 
United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981) (citations omitted). 
In the absence of a "clearly expressed legislative intention to 
the contrary," the language of the statute itself "must ordi-
narily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 
(1980). Despite respondents' contentions and the reasoning 
of the Court of Appeals, we do not find that the legislative 
7 See Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F. 2d, at 647-648 (no immunity 
for flooding if innundation " 'wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress au-
thorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control, or any act under-
taken pursuant to any such authorization'"), quoting Peterson v. United 
States, 367 F. 2d 271 (CA9 1966); Hayes v. United States, 585 F. 2d 701, 
702-703 (CA4 1978) ("If the plaintiff could prove damage to his farm as a 
result of the dam's operation as a recreational facility without relation to 
the operation of the dam as a flood control project, he would avoid the abso-
lute bar of § 702c"). 
We have noted that here the District Courts in each case found that the 
waters were being released from federal flood control facilities to prevent 
flooding. App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a, 68a. The Court of Appeals upheld 
these findings, 760 F. 2d, at 603, and assumed that "the waters in this [con-
solidated] case were floodwaters." I d., at 594, n. 6. 
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history of the statute justifies departure from the plain words 
of the statute. Indeed, on balance we think the legislative 
history of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 534, rein-
forces the plain language of the immunity provision in § 702c. 
The Flood Control Act enacted "a comprehensive ten-year 
program for the entire [Mississippi River] valley, embodying 
a general bank protection scheme, channel stablization and 
river regulation, all involving vast expenditures of public 
funds." United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256, 262 
(1939). The Act was the Nation's response to the disastrous 
flood in the Mississippi Valley in 1927. That flood resulted in 
the loss of nearly 200 lives and more than $200 million in 
property damage; almost 700,000 people were left homeless. 
S. Rep. No. 619, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1928). The flood 
control system in the Mississippi River Valley in response to 
this catastrophe was the largest public works project under-
taken up to that time in the United States. 8 
It is not surprising, in the light of the devastation wrought 
by the 1927 flood and the magnitude of Congress' undertak-
ing, that the legislative history of § 702c shows a consistent 
concern for limiting the Federal Government's financial liabil-
ity to expenditures directly necessary for the construction 
and operation of the various projects. Numerous state-
ments concerning the immunity provision confirm that it was 
intended to reaffirm sovereign immunity in such a dangerous 
8 Rep. Snell, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, stated in report-
ing the rules on debate for the Flood Control Act of 1928: 
"(T]he legislation made in order under this rule is the most important mat-
ter that has been brought before this House since the declaration of war 
about 11 years ago. This legislation provides for the most gigantic under-
taking in construction and engineering that any government in the civilized 
world has ever undertaken. . . . (I]t is much larger and will cost four 
times as much as the Panama Canal. " 69 Cong. Rec. 6640 (1928). 
The statute authorized $325 million for the program, Act of May 15, 1928, 
ch. 569, § 1, 45 Stat. 534-535, but estimates of the cost of the entire project 
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and extensive project. The Chairman of the House Rules 
Committee, in opening the discussion on the rule governing 
debate on the 1928 Act, stated: 
"I want this bill so drafted that it will contain all the 
safeguards necessary for the Federal Government. If 
we go down there and furnish protection to these peo-
ple-and I assume it is a national responsibility-! do 
not want to have anything left out of the bill that would 
protect us now and for all time to come. I for one do not 
want to open up a situation that will cause thousands of 
lawsuits for damages against the Federal Government in 
the next 10, 20, or 50 years." 69 Cong. Rec. 6641 (1928) 
(remarks of Rep. Snell). 
A number of other congressmen unequivocally stated that 
the United States should not be liable for any expense other 
than the direct cost of constructing the project. See id., at 
7028 (remarks of Rep. Spearing); id., at 6999-7000 (remarks 
of Rep. Frear). 9 
These statements show that the sweeping language of 
§ 702c was no drafting inadvertence. See National Mfg. Co. 
v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263, 270 (CAS), cert. denied, 347 
U. S. 967 (1954). Congress clearly sought to ensure beyond 
doubt that sovereign immunity would protect the govern-
ment from "any" liability associated with flood control. As 
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained three 
decades ago inN ational Mfg., § 702c's language "safeguarded 
the United States against liability of any kind for damage 
from or by floods or flood waters in the broadest and most 
9 Respondents have argued that Congress would not have enacted 
§ 702c if it were merely a codification of the Federal Government's sover-
eign immunity. The legislative history refutes this contention. One of 
the principal Congressmen in the debates concerning the immunity provi-
sion in § 702c remarked: "While it is wise to insert that provision in the bill, 
it is not necessary, because the Supreme Court of the United States has 
decided ... that the Government is not liable for any of these damages." 
69 Cong. Rec. 702~ (1928) (remarks of Rep. Spearing). 
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emphatic language." 210 F. 2d, at 270. The equally broad 
and emphatic language found in the legislative history shows 
that Congress understood what it was saying. We therefore 
conclude that the legislative history fully supports attribut-




Respondents nevertheless advance several alternative 
readings of§ 702c's seemingly clear language. 
Respondents Butler and James argue that the immunity 
provision of § 702c was enacted to bar claims against the 
Government for damages to property that do not rise to the 
level of a constitutional taking. The provision, according to 
this argument, assured the Federal Government control over 
paying for property rights that it acquired under the proviso 
of § 702c (authorizing purchase of interests in certain proper-
ties bordering the Mississippi River) and under § 702d (au-
thorizing purchase of "flowage rights") by barring claims for 
such property rights, except in situations involving a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment. Such a reading, it is con-
tended, would still allow recovery for damages to persons or 
property not connected with these acquisitions. 
We do not agree. Both § 702d and the proviso of § 702c 
provide for compensation by the Federal Government for the 
acquisition of certain kinds of property rights. We cannot 
see why Congress would first determine that these property 
rights deserved compenstion, and then in the same statute 
give the Federal Government absolute discretion to decide 
whether to pay that compensation. Moreover, there is little 
in the legislative history that would even colorably support 
the proposition that the immunity provision in § 702c was in-
tended to bar only liability for the compensation described in 
the proviso and § 702d. Section 702c's immunity provision 
and proviso were introduced by different sponsors. 69 
Cong. Rec. 7023 (1928). Congress unanimously accepted the 
.. 
The cases on which 
respondents Butler 
and James rely re-
late to personal 
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immunity provision, but enacted the proviso only after de-
bate and by a vote of 111-79. Id., at 7023. The debates on 
the proviso, which addressed the narrow issue of whether 
compensation should be provided to property owners affected 
by the construction of levees on the opposite bank of the 
river, see id., at 6642, contain no reference to the immunity 
provision, see id., at 6642, 7022-7023. Similarly, the debate 
on § 702d does not reveal any relationship between that sec-
tion and the immunity provision in 702c. Id., at 7104-7111. 
Finally, and most importantly, the proffered interpretation 
of§ 702c ignores the broad language of the statute. If Con-
gress had wished to bar actions for compensation for pur-
chases under § 702c's proviso and § 702d, presumably it would 
have done so more specifically. 
Respondents Butler and James also argue, in the alterna-
tive, that even if § 702c is intended to grant immunity in con-
nection with flood control projects, the Federal Government 
is not entitled to immunity here because their injuries arose 
from Government employees' alleged mismanagement of rec-
reational activities wholly unrelated to flood control. In sup-
port of this argument they point to a "fundamental principle 
of immunity" that the "sphere or protected activity must be 
narrowly limited by the purpose for which the immunity was 
granted." We think, however, that the manner in which to 
convey warnings, including the negligent failure to do so, is 
part of the "management" of a flood control project. And as 
noted n. 7, supra, the Court of Appeals found that the 
release of the waters at the Millwood Reservoir and at the 
Cortableau Basin was clearly related to flood control. More-
over, the broad principle applicable here is that a "clear relin-
quishment of sovereign immunity [is required] to give justifi-
cation for tort actions." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 
15, 31 (1953). 10 
'~ee Brief for Respondents James eta!. 33, citing, inter alia, Harlow v. 
Fillgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald , 457 U. S. 731 (1982); 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978). 
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B 
Respondent Clardy adopts the en bane Court of Appeals' 
reading of § 702c: Congress enacted the section to immunize 
the Federal Government from liability only for property 
damage resulting directly from construction of flood control 
projects. 
To support this argument, both respondent Clardy and the 
Court of Appeals rely on the portion of the legislative history 
of§ 702c that concerns the Government's acquisition of prop-
erty rights. According to the argument, the House of Rep-
resentatives, where the provision originated, enacted § 702c 
solely in response to the Senate version of the Flood Control 
Act, which would have created broad remedies for property 
owners, offering "[j]ust compensation" for "all property used, 
taken, damaged, or destroyed in carrying out the flood con-
trol plan." 11 S. 3740, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1928), 69 
Cong. Rec. 5483 (1928). This language would have provided 
Respondents Butler and James have also argued that the immunity pro-
vision of§ 702c applies only to projects authorized under the 1928 Act, and 
therefore does not extend to the Millwood Project. Section 702c is not by 
its terms restricted to projects constructed under the 1928 Act. Nor 
would it make sense for the Federal Government to have immunity only for 
some, but not all, of its flood control projects. We find no merit to this 
argument. 
"Section 702c, which consists of both the immunity provision at issue 
and a proviso, reads: 
"No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for 
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, how-
ever, That if in carrying out the purposes of . . . this title it shall be found 
that upon any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it is impracti-
cable to construct levees, either because such construction is not economi-
cally justified or because such construction would unreasonably restrict the 
flood channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are subjected to over-
flow and damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by reason of 
the construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it shall be the 
duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers to institute 
proceedings on behalf of the United States Government to acquire either 
the absolute ownership of the lands so subjected to overflow and damage or 
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compensation well beyond the requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment's takings clause. It accordingly met with sub-
stantial hostility in the House, where members feared it 
might "make the railroads" and other large property owners 
"a present of many millions of dollars." Id., at 6712 (re-
marks of Congressman Kopp). 
According to respondent Clardy, § 702c was added simply 
to counteract this generosity, and to prevent any excess costs 
for the acquisition of flowage rights or easements after the 
completion of the flood control project. Since none of the 
respondents' claims stem from property damage due to 
construction of a dam or reservoir, the argument goes, 
§ 702c's immunity does not apply, and the government may 
be held liable for its failure to warn the public of "the exist-
ence of hazards to their accepted use of government-im-
pounded water or nearby land." 760 F. 2d, at 603. 
We find no merit to this argument. It is true that during 
the debates on the Act, several Congressmen used the terms 
"liability" and "damage" to refer only to property damage 
caused by the construction of the flood control projects. 
But, as we have noted above, there are numerous passages in 
the legislative history that emphasize the intention of Con-
gress to protect the Federal Government from any damages 
liability that might arise out of flood control. Supra, at 
~. We think that the "fragments of legislative history" 
on which respondent Clardy and the Court of Appeals relied 
fall far short of amounting "to a clearly expressed legislative 
intent contrary to the plain language of the statute." Amer-
ican Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S., at 75. 
v 
As the facts in this case demonstrate, one can well under-
stand why the Court of Appeals sought to find a principled 
way to hold the Government responsible for its concededly 
negligent conduct. But our role is to effectuate Congress' 
intent, and Congress rarely speaks more plainly than it has in 
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the prov1s10n we apply here. If that provision is to be 
changed, it should be by Congress and not by this Court. 
We therefore follow the plain language of § 702c, a section of 
the 1928 Act that received careful consideration by Congress 
and that has remained unchanged for nearly sixty years, and 
hold that the Federal Government is immune from suit in 
these cases. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit is accordingly reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rES 
No. 85-434 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
CHARLOTTE JAMES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
As a part of the major undertaking authorized by the Mis-
sissippi Flood Control Act of 1928, Congress directed the 
Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers to take special 
steps to acquire lands that were subject to "overflow dam-
age" along the banks of the Mississippi River where it was 
impracticable to construct levees. In the section of the Act 
containing that specific direction concerning the acquisition of 
"lands so subject to overflow damage," there is a sentence 
stating that "[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest 
upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or 
flood waters at any place." 1 
'Section 3 of the statute, which is now codified as 33 U. S. C. § 702c, 
reads in full as follows: · 
"Sec. 3. Except when authorized by the Secretary of War upon the rec-
ommendation of the Chief of Engineers, no money appropriated under au-
thority of this Act shall be expended on the construction of any item of the 
project until the States or levee districts have given assurances satisfac-
tory to the Secretary of War that they will (a) maintain all flood-control 
works after their completion, except controlling and regulating spillway 
structures, including special relief levees; maintenance includes normally 
such matters as cutting grass, removal of weeds, local drainage, and minor 
repairs of main river levees; (b) agree to accept land turned over to them 
under the provisions of section 4; (c) provide without cost to the United 
States, all rights of way for levee foundations and levees on the main stem 
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According to the Court, Congress intended by this section 
to immunize the Federal Government from liability for any 
claim for personal injury, even though Congress provided ex-
pressly for compensation for property damage in excess of 
that required by the Constitution. 2 In my view, neither the 
plain language of the statute nor the legislative history be-
hind it support imputing such a perverse design to the Legis-
lature. In my opinion, this provision applies only to prop-
erty damage, and the judgment below should be affirmed. 3 
Section 3 absolves the United States of liability for any 
"damage" by floods or flood waters. The word "damage" 
traditionally describes a harm to property (hence, "property 
damage"), rather than harm to the person (i. e., "personal 
injury"). As Chief Judge Cockburn explained in Smith v. 
Brown, 40 L. J. Q. B. (n. s.) 214, 218 (1871): 
"The question is whether a personal injury occasioned by 
the collision of two vessels comes under the term 'dam-
of the Mississippi River between Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and the Head 
of Passes. 
"No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for 
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, how-
ever, That if in carrying out the purposes of this Act it shall be found that 
upon any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it is impracticable to 
construct levees, either because such construction is not economically justi-
fied or because such construction would unreasonably restrict the flood 
channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are subjected to overflow 
and damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by reason of the 
construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it shall be the duty 
of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers to institute proceedings 
on behalf of the United States Government to acquire either the absolute 
ownership of the lands so subjected to overflow and damage or floodage 
rights over such lands." 45 Stat. 535-536. 
2 Congress rejected an amendment to § 3 to provide only such compensa-
tion as would be required by the Constitution-a measure that Congress 
thought excluded flowage rights. See 69 Gong. Rec. 7104-7111, 7122 
(1928). 
3 My reading of the statute and its legislative history also persuades me 
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age' as used in the 7th section. Now the words used are 
undoubtedly very extensive, but it is to be observed that 
neither in common parlance nor in legal phraseology is 
the word 'damage' used as applicable to injuries done to 
the person, but solely as applicable to mischief done to 
property. Still less is this term applicable to loss of life 
or injury resulting therefrom, to a widow or surviving 
relative. We speak indeed of 'damages' as compensa-
tion for injury done to the person, but the term 'dam-
ages' is not employed interchangeably with the term 'in-
jury,' with reference to mischief wrongfully occasioned 
to the person. . . . [T]his distinction is not a matter of 
mere verbal criticism, but is of a substantial character 
and necessary to be attended to . . . . " 
See Seward v. The Owners ofthe Vera Cruz, 54 L. J. P. D. & 
A. 9, 13 (1884) (Lord Chancellor); Simpson v. Blues, 41 
L. J. C. P. (n. s.) 121, 128 (1872). This understanding of 
"damage" was not peculiar to English common law courts, 
but was the preferred definition found in legal dictionaries 
and in legal encyclopedias in use in the United States at the 
time Congress drafted the Mississippi Flood Control Act in 
1928. See, e. g., Bouvier's Law Dictionary 749 (3d rev. 
1914); 15 Am. Jur., Damages§ 2, p. 388 (1938) ("A distinction 
is to be noted between the word 'damage' and 'damages.' 
'Damage' is defined to be the loss, injury, or deterioration 
caused by negligence, design, or accident of one person to an-
other in respect of the latter's personal property, whereas 
'damages' signifies compensation in money for the loss or 
damage" (emphasis added)); 17 C. J., Damage 698 (1919) ("It 
has been held that neither in common parlance nor in legal 
phraseology is the word [damage] used as applicable to inju-
ries done to the person, but solely as applicable to mischief 
done to property; and, although we speak of damages as com-
pensation for injury done to the person, yet the term is not 
employed interchangeably with the term 'injury,' with refer-
ence to mischief wrongfully occasioned to the person; but 
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there is authority to the effect that the term 'damage' in-
cludes personal injuries; and where the context shows that 
damage means personal injury, the term will be so 
construed"). 
Because the preferred definition of "damage" in 1928 ex-
cluded harm to the person, one would think that the Court-
in accordance with the "plain meaning" of § 3--would con-
strue the immunity provision to bar liability only for property 
damage. Surprisingly, the Court reaches precisely the op-
posite conclusion. Its analysis, however, relies entirely on 
authorities which define "damages"-or the monetary rem-
edy imposed on one found liable for a legal wrong-rather 
than "damage"-which is the term Congress employed to 
identify the liability from which the Federal Government was 
thereafter excused. It is therefore quite beside the point 
that "damages" have "'historically been awarded both for in-
jury to property and injury to the person." Ante, at 7 (quot-
ing American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 450 
(1947)), for the statute bars liability for "damage," not "dam-
ages." Indeed, the Court's own authorities, see ante, at 7 
and n. 5, distinguish between the two terms: 
"It might be noted here that there is a distinction be-
tween damage and damages. Black's law Dictionary 
cautions that the word 'damage,' meaning 'Loss, injury, 
or deterioration,' is 'to be distinguished from its plural,-
"damages,"-which means a compensation in money for a 
loss or damage."' American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 
U. 8., at 450, n. 6. 4 
'The treatises on damages on which the Court relies likewise subscribe 
to this definition of "damages," see 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages 
§ 29 (9th ed. 1912); 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages § 2, p. 4 (4th ed. 
1916); id. , § 12, p. 46, and the distinction between the two words appears 
to have been universally observed, see, e. g., 15 Am. Jur., Damages § 2, 
p. 388; 8 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 535 (2d ed. 1898); W. 
Hale, Law of Damages 9, 12-13 (2d ed. 1912). In fact, the authorities 
cited by the Court support the traditional interpretation of "damage"; for 
example, in the index to his treatise Mr. Sedgwick refers to "damage" only 
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The Court thus provides no basis for thinking that Congress 
used "damage" other than in its common, preferred usage to 
mean property damage. If "plain meaning" is our polestar, 
the immunity provision does not bar respondents' personal 
injury suits. 
The remainder of the statute and its legislative history 
similarly provide no basis for assuming that Congress used 
"damage" to bar liability for personal injuries. The text of 
§ 3---indeed, the text of the entire Mississippi Flood Control 
Act of 1928--contains no reference to personal injury. 
Moreover, when the sentence beginning "[n]o liability" is 
read together with the proviso which is appended to it, it is 
most readily understood as relating to the kind of harm that 
the paragraph as a whole describes-namely, the harm to 
"land subject to overflow damage." As the text of§ 3 of the 
Act plainly states, see n. 1, supra, the Federal Government 
assumed certain responsibilities for areas in which the con-
struction of levees was not practicable. Given that specific 
and limited undertaking, the sentence limiting liability is best 
understood as making it clear that the Federal Government 
accepted no additional responsibilities and did not intend to 
create a new federal judicial remedy for failing to carry out 
its undertaking. Indeed, a claim that the 1928 Act created a 
new federal remedy for property damage was advanced and 
rejected in United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256, 
269-270 (1939). Thus, the text of§ 3 read as a whole irresist-
ibly implies that the sentence in question was intended 
merely to place a limit on the potential liability of the United 
States that might otherwise have arisen from the direction to 
the Secretary of the War and the Chief of Engineers concern-
ing overflow damage to land. 5 
when referring to property damage. See 4 T. Sedgwick, supra, 
p. 3160-3162. 
' The Court, see ante, at 11-12, is simply wrong in intimating that the 
immunity sentence and its proviso were dissociated from each other during 
their consideration before Congress. The Court's observation that the im-
'• 
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The legislative history of the statute is entirely consistent 
with this reading. It was a response, not only to the disas-
trous flood of 1927, but to the perennial threat to landowners 
in the alluvial valley of the Mississippi River posed by recur-
rent floods since at least 1717. See United States v. 
Sponenbarger, 308 U. S., at 260-262. During the lengthy 
hearings and debates on the 1928 legislation, there was ex-
tensive discussion of the allocation of the cost of property 
damage, both past and future, among private interests, local 
governmental entities, and the Federal Government. See 
ante, at 9-11 (quoting estimates of the costs of construction 
and acquisition of property). There was no discussion that I 
have been able to find concerning potential liability for per-
sonal injuries. If Congress meant to include personal injury 
"damage" in the immunity conferred by § 3, one would expect 
to find some explanation why it authorized extraconstitu-
munity provision and the proviso were sponsored by different Congress-
men is only trivially true: the proviso was offered by Representative Gar-
rett of Tennessee as an amendment to the immunity provision, which was 
itself a pending amendment·, sponsored by Representative Reid of Illinois, 
to the bill before the House of Representatives. 69 Cong. Rec. 7022 
(1928). The sponsor of the proviso, Representative Garrett, offered his 
amendment as an amendment to the immunity provision before it was ac-
cepted by the House of Representatives. Ibid. In explaining the reason 
for this, Representative Garrett underscored the symbiotic relationship 
between the immunity provision and the proviso: 
"Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to agree with the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. MADDEN] that the amendment which the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. REID] has proposed more properly would come in another section, 
but if it is to come now it seems to me that my amendment will have to 
come in connection with it at this place. I do not want to lose any rights in 
connection with it." Ibid. (emphasis added). 
A short while later, the House passed Representative Garrett's amend-
ment adding the proviso to the amendment containing the immunity provi-
sion. !d., at 7023. Immediately thereafter, the House agreed to "the 
amendment of the gentleman from Illinois as amended by the amendment 
ofthe gentlemanfrom Tennessee." Ibid. (remarks of the Chairman) (em-
phasis added). The immunity provision and the proviso were thus consid-
ered and passed as a package. 
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tional compensation for property damage but nothing for per-
sonal injury. The expected explanation is nowhere to be 
found. 
Construing the immunity sentence as a limit on the com-
pensation authorized in § 3 also avoids rendering that sen-
tence superfluous. The 70th Congress had no reason to 
enact a special statute to protect the Federal Government 
from tort liability for personal injuries for the simple reason 
that another decade and a half was to pass before Congress 
enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 6 and "put aside 
its sovereign armor in cases where federal employees have 
tortiously caused personal injury or property damage." 7 It 
is quite unrealistic to assume that in 1928, Congress enacted 
a special provision to avoid a liability from which it was al-
ready immune. 8 
6 60 Stat. 812, 842-847. 
7 American Stevedores, Inc. v. Parella, 330 U. S., at 453. It is interest-
ing to note that in the Tort Claims Act itself, Congress repeatedly referred 
in the alternative to claims "on account of damage to a loss of property or 
on account of personal injury or death," see 60 Stat. 843, 845-846. 
Revealingly, the Committee Reports on the Act did not understand 
there to be any bar to liability for personal injuries resulting from flood 
control projects: 
"This is a highly important exception, intended to preclude any possibility 
that the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the 
Government growing out of an authorized activity, such as a flood control 
or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of any Government 
agent is shown." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 29, n. 21 (1953) 
(quoting H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10 (1942); S. Rep. 
No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5-6 (1946)). 
8 This construction is also consistent with 58 years of decisional law. 
The statute the Court construes today has been on the books for more than 
half a century, but prior to this case there appears to be no reported deci-
sion in which the Government successfully asserted it as a defense to a per-
sonal injury claim. See 760 F. 2d 590, 599, n. 16 (CA5 1985). It has been 
repeatedly and successfully invoked in property damage litigation, but the 
application of the statute that the Court upholds today is completely un-
precedented. Given the number and the size of Federal' Flood Control 
.. 
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It would be regrettable but obligatory for this Court to 
construe the immunity provision to bar personal injury claims 
if such was the intent of Congress. But when a critical term 
in the statute suggests a more limited construction, and when 
the congressional debates are not only consistent with this 
construction but nowhere reveal a recognition, let alone an 
intention, that it would deprive those injured by govern-
mental negligence of any remedy, duty compels the contrary 
conclusion. It defies belief-and ascribes to the Members of 
Congress a perverse, even barbaric, intent-to think that 
they spent days debating the measure of extraconstitutional 
compensation they would provide riparian landowners but ·in-
tended-without a single word of dissent-to condemn the 
widows, orphans, and injured tort victims of negligent opera-
tion of flood control projects to an irrational exclusion from 
the protection of the subsequently enacted Tort Claims Act. 
I respectfully dissent. 
projects throughout our great Nation, and given the fact that the kind of 
recreational use disclosed by this record is fairly common, it is telling that, 
until today's decision, immunity had never been upheld in defense to such a 
claim. · 
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85-434 United States v. James, et al. 
This case is here on cert from the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
It involves two separate boating accident~n 
flood control projects in Arkansas and Louisiana. In 
each case, recreational boaters were injured or kille~ 
when the Corps of Engineers opened the flood gate~nd 
persons were sucked through the retaining structures. 
Two suits, consolidated below, were brought 
under the Torts Claim Act against the United Stat~for 
negligence/ in failing properly to warn people/ who used 
the lakes for recreational purposes. Section 702(c) of 
the statute that authorized federal flood control 
projects;'xpressly provides: 
"No liability of any kind shall attach to/ or 
rest upon/ the United States for any damage/ 
from /or byj floodsj or flood waters at any 
place." 
~~~4t-- -The Court of Appeals construed this language 
"' as not applying to negligent or wrongful acts of 
government employees. We hold that the plain language 
of the statute controls: it speaks in terms of "any 
damage ••• from flood waters at any place". 
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It is well to remember / that our role is to 
effectuate the intent of Congress, / and Congress rarely 
speaks more plainly~than it has in the provision we 
apply today. This language was adopted in 1928, and 
has remained unchanged for nearly 60 years. We reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
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